Abstract
John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory (especially his answer to the Problem of Induction) has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, which has a more propitious answer to the Problem of Induction.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 672-695 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 86 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |