Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning


*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


The problem of peer disagreement is to explain how you should respond when you and a peer have the same evidence bearing on some proposition P and are equally competent epistemic agents, yet have reached opposite conclusions about P . According to Christensen's Independence Thesis, in assessing the effect of your peer's disagreement, you must not rely on the reasoning behind your initial belief. I note that ‘the reasoning behind your initial belief’ can be given either a token or type reading. I argue that the type reading is false, but the token reading is extremely weak.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 21 Jun 2022

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© 2022 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.


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