Do short-sale constraints inhibit information acquisition? Evidence from Regulation SHO

Lixin Nancy SU*, Sonia Man-Lai WONG, Xue YUAN, Xiaofeng ZHAO

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

We investigate how short-sale constraints influence investor information acquisition. Leveraging the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Regulation SHO pilot program, we find that relaxed short-sale constraints lead to increased public information acquisition by investors. Investors acquire and process valuable information and utilize it to improve their short-selling decisions after the relaxation of short-sale constraints. We obtain similar findings using a quasi-natural experiment in China that lifted short-sale bans, supporting the external validity of our results. Collectively, our evidence demonstrates that reduced trading frictions promote information acquisition and contribute to price discovery.
Original languageEnglish
Article number100945
JournalJournal of Financial Markets
Early online date14 Sept 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Sept 2024

Bibliographical note

We appreciate the helpful comments from Yangyang Chen, Di Cui, Fangjian Fu and the conference and seminar participants at Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) Annual Conference. Xiaofeng Zhao acknowledges that the work described in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China ([130354] Project No. LU 23500019).

Publisher Copyright: © 2024 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Information acquisition
  • Price informativeness
  • Regulation SHO
  • Short-sale constraints

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