Projects per year
Abstract
We investigate how short-sale constraints influence investor information acquisition. Leveraging the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Regulation SHO pilot program, we find that relaxed short-sale constraints lead to increased public information acquisition by investors. Investors acquire and process valuable information and utilize it to improve their short-selling decisions after the relaxation of short-sale constraints. We obtain similar findings using a quasi-natural experiment in China that lifted short-sale bans, supporting the external validity of our results. Collectively, our evidence demonstrates that reduced trading frictions promote information acquisition and contribute to price discovery.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 100945 |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Markets |
| Volume | 72 |
| Early online date | 14 Sept 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Acknowledgements:We appreciate the helpful comments from Yangyang Chen, Di Cui, Fangjian Fu and the conference and seminar participants at Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) Annual Conference.
Publisher Copyright: © 2024 Elsevier B.V.
Funding
Xiaofeng Zhao acknowledges that the work described in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China ([130354] Project No. LU 23500019).
Keywords
- Information acquisition
- Price informativeness
- Regulation SHO
- Short-sale constraints
Projects
- 1 Finished
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Short-sale Constraints and Access to Management: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (賣空限制和管理層接觸:來自隨機實驗的證據)
ZHAO, X. (PI)
Research Grants Council (Hong Kong, China)
1/01/20 → 31/12/22
Project: Grant Research