Does Auditor Litigation Risk Constrain Corporate Tax Avoidance? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

We examine the effect of auditors’ litigation risk on corporate tax avoidance following pivotal U.S. court rulings. Our findings indicate a significant association between increased litigation risk and reduced tax avoidance that persists even after controlling for other influencing factors. A focused analysis of New Jersey and California with lower auditor litigation risks reveals higher levels of tax avoidance. This effect is more pronounced among financially constrained companies, firms with higher litigation risk, and firms that previously engaged in significant tax avoidance, particularly when audited by Big N auditors. This research addresses the call for more insight into the benefits of increased auditor litigation risk, shedding light on the complex interplay between auditor behavior and tax avoidance. It also informs the ongoing discussions on whether expanding auditor liability to third-party claims can enhance audit quality.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)113-141
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of International Accounting Research
Volume24
Issue number3
Early online date2 Apr 2025
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2025

Bibliographical note

We thank Ling Lei Lisic (editor) and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful suggestions. We also thank Russ Hamilton (discussant) and workshop participants at the 2022 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting and the 2022 European Accounting Association Annual Meeting for their helpful comments. The authors declare no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Keywords

  • auditor litigation risk
  • tax avoidance
  • state liability laws
  • effective tax rates

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