Does Managerial Overconfidence Change with Market Conditions? Risk Management for Financial Institutions

Overconfidence (hubris or overestimation of one’s ability to perform) has been viewed in the finance literature as a character trait that is stable over time, e.g., assuming that if a manager is overconfident, he/she is overconfident all the time. In this paper, we aim to show that managerial overconfidence can be state-contingent, i.e., the level of managerial overconfidence could be influenced by an external economic shock such as the global financial crisis in 2008. A novelty of this paper is to provide evidence for and application of the concept of state-based managerial overconfidence, which is new in the finance literature. Two empirical studies were reported. In the first study (Study 1), we analyzed real market data by linear regression. We found that managerial overconfidence could vary according to changes in the state of the macroeconomy or tightening of corporate governance policies. In the second study (Study 2), we conducted a lab experiment simulating how external manipulations could alter participants’ confidence level. Both our empirical studies provide strong evidence of state-contingent overconfidence by Student’s t-test and contribute to the current finance literature, which assumes overconfidence as a personality trait. Our findings have important practical implications for the credit market. According to the state-contingent overconfidence hypothesis, creditors might reduce the loan amount or the loan duration (or other loan contract terms) too excessively by more than the efficient level during an economic downturn if the offsetting effect of state-contingent overconfidence is ignored.