Education and signaling : evidence from a highly competitive labor market

John S. HEYWOOD, Xiangdong WEI

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper directly tests for differences in returns to education between the employed and self-employed in Hong Kong. Using a step-function, we find significantly smaller returns for the self-employed, suggesting that in the highly competitive labor market of Hong Kong education plays a signaling role. This pattern persists for both genders, when accounting for self-selection into employment status and when accounting for self-employed professionals who signal.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-16
Number of pages16
JournalEducation Economics
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2004

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