Embezzlement versus bribery

C. Simon FAN, Chen LIN, Daniel TREISMAN

Research output: Working paperWorking paper series

Abstract

Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget--embezzling or misspending funds--or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services--bribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery--even though embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the "efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous.

Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMassachusetts
PublisherNational Bureau of Economic Research
Number of pages38
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010

Publication series

NameNBER Working Paper Series
PublisherNational Bureau of Economic Research
No.16542

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  • Cite this

    FAN, C. S., LIN, C., & TREISMAN, D. (2010). Embezzlement versus bribery. (NBER Working Paper Series; No. 16542). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w16542