Emergence of cooperative coalition in NIPD game with localization of interaction and learning

Yeon-Gyu SEO; Sung-Bae CHO; Xin YAO

doi:10.1109/CEC.1999.782515

Emergence of cooperative coalition in NIPD game with localization of interaction and learning

Yeon-Gyu SEO, Sung-Bae CHO, Xin YAO

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Conference paper (refereed) › Research › peer-review

17 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

The N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma (NIPD) game has been used widely to study the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. Previous work on the NIPD game studied the impact of the number of players and the payoff function on the evolution of cooperation. This paper studies the localization issue in the NIPD game and investigates the impact of local interaction on genetically evolved strategies for the NIPD game. Our experimental results show that localization of interaction has a major impact on the evolution of cooperative coalitions, while localized learning makes the population oscillate. This paper also investigates the effect of the history length in the NIPD game. It is found experimentally that a longer history makes a population more stable, but it takes longer time to reach this stable state. © 1999 IEEE.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 1999 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 1999
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	877-884
Number of pages	8
Volume	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.1999.782515
Publication status	Published - 20 Jan 2003
Externally published	Yes

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title = "Emergence of cooperative coalition in NIPD game with localization of interaction and learning",

abstract = "The N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma (NIPD) game has been used widely to study the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. Previous work on the NIPD game studied the impact of the number of players and the payoff function on the evolution of cooperation. This paper studies the localization issue in the NIPD game and investigates the impact of local interaction on genetically evolved strategies for the NIPD game. Our experimental results show that localization of interaction has a major impact on the evolution of cooperative coalitions, while localized learning makes the population oscillate. This paper also investigates the effect of the history length in the NIPD game. It is found experimentally that a longer history makes a population more stable, but it takes longer time to reach this stable state. {\textcopyright} 1999 IEEE.",

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Emergence of cooperative coalition in NIPD game with localization of interaction and learning. / SEO, Yeon-Gyu; CHO, Sung-Bae; YAO, Xin.
Proceedings of the 1999 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 1999. Vol. 2 IEEE Computer Society, 2003. p. 877-884 782515.

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Conference paper (refereed) › Research › peer-review

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AU - CHO, Sung-Bae

AU - YAO, Xin

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N2 - The N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma (NIPD) game has been used widely to study the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. Previous work on the NIPD game studied the impact of the number of players and the payoff function on the evolution of cooperation. This paper studies the localization issue in the NIPD game and investigates the impact of local interaction on genetically evolved strategies for the NIPD game. Our experimental results show that localization of interaction has a major impact on the evolution of cooperative coalitions, while localized learning makes the population oscillate. This paper also investigates the effect of the history length in the NIPD game. It is found experimentally that a longer history makes a population more stable, but it takes longer time to reach this stable state. © 1999 IEEE.

AB - The N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma (NIPD) game has been used widely to study the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. Previous work on the NIPD game studied the impact of the number of players and the payoff function on the evolution of cooperation. This paper studies the localization issue in the NIPD game and investigates the impact of local interaction on genetically evolved strategies for the NIPD game. Our experimental results show that localization of interaction has a major impact on the evolution of cooperative coalitions, while localized learning makes the population oscillate. This paper also investigates the effect of the history length in the NIPD game. It is found experimentally that a longer history makes a population more stable, but it takes longer time to reach this stable state. © 1999 IEEE.

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Emergence of cooperative coalition in NIPD game with localization of interaction and learning

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