Empirical evidence claims are a priori

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

Empirical evidence claims are a priori

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

This paper responds to Achinstein's criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as 'e is evidence for h' (or 'e confirms h to degree r') is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein's objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2821-2834
Number of pages	14
Journal	Synthese
Volume	190
Issue number	14
Early online date	17 May 2012
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x
Publication status	Published - Sept 2013
Event	The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference 2011 - University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Duration: 7 Jul 2011 → 8 Jul 2011 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/2011bsps/

Bibliographical note

The same paper is presented at the 2011 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, United Kingdom, 7-8 July 2011.

Keywords

A priori thesis
Achinstein
Confirmation
Evidence
Working assumptions

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10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper responds to Achinstein's criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as 'e is evidence for h' (or 'e confirms h to degree r') is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein's objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.",

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AB - This paper responds to Achinstein's criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as 'e is evidence for h' (or 'e confirms h to degree r') is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein's objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

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KW - Achinstein

KW - Confirmation

KW - Evidence

KW - Working assumptions

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DO - 10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

SN - 0039-7857

VL - 190

SP - 2821

EP - 2834

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

IS - 14

T2 - The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference 2011

Y2 - 7 July 2011 through 8 July 2011

ER -

Empirical evidence claims are a priori

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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Empirical Evidence Claims Are A Priori

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