Endogenous lobbying positions

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


This paper develops a two‐country, two‐firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra‐industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free‐trade position. The model predicts that taking the free‐trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free‐trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free‐trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)641-653
Number of pages13
JournalReview of International Economics
Issue number4
Early online date19 Aug 2008
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2008
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Financial support from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong.

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