Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation

Research output: Other contributionThesis/DissertationResearch

Abstract

A central bank is usually assigned two functions: the control of inflation and the maintenance of a safety-banking sector. What are the precise conditions under which trigger strategies from the private sector can solve the time inconsistency problem and induce the central bank to choose zero inflation under a nonstationary natural rate? Can an optimal contract be used together with reputation forces to implement a desired socially optimal monetary policy rule? How to design a truth-telling contract to control the risk taking behaviors of the bank? My dissertation attempts to deal with these issues using three primary methodologies: monetary economics, game theory and optimal stochastic control theory.
Original languageEnglish
TypeDoctoral dissertation
PublisherTexas A & M University
Place of PublicationTexas, United States
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Monetary policy
Banking regulation
Central bank
Inflation
Control theory
Monetary economics
Optimal contract
Natural rate
Time inconsistency
Optimal monetary policy rules
Banking sector
Risk-taking behavior
Methodology
Safety
Trigger strategies
Truth-telling
Private sector
Game theory

Cite this

LI, J. (2004, Aug). Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation. Texas, United States: Texas A & M University.
LI, Jingyuan. / Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation. 2004. Texas, United States : Texas A & M University.
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LI, J 2004, Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation. Texas A & M University, Texas, United States.

Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation. / LI, Jingyuan.

Texas, United States : Texas A & M University. 2004, Doctoral dissertation.

Research output: Other contributionThesis/DissertationResearch

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