We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
|Lecture Notes in Computer Science
|Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
|10th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature, PPSN 2008
|13/09/08 → 17/09/08
- Decentralised systems
- Market-based control
- Self-interested agents