Abstract
Unlimited associative learning (UAL) has recently been advanced as an epistemic marker for the evolutionary origin of consciousness. One feature of this approach is that it eschews theoretical commitments concerning the mechanisms responsible for consciousness. We argue that the plausibility of the UAL framework depends on making such theoretical commitments. Without such commitments, the UAL framework remains silent regarding important edge cases and fails to distinguish between clusters and clutters of properties sufficient for consciousness. We conclude that the UAL framework would benefit from returning to earlier theory-heavy approaches — i.e. those that make substantial commitments to the mechanisms responsible for consciousness.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 62-77 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Journal of Consciousness Studies |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 3-4 |
Early online date | 1 Mar 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:@ IprintAcadeic.
Funding
We thank Benjamin Henke and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback and discussion, as well as the editors of this special issue, particularly Heather Browning. This project was supported by a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation.