Ex ante vs. Ex post rationalization of action

    Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

    Abstract

    This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, and the name "quasi-rational" is legitimated for the type of actions this example represents. Last, but not least, the paper demonstrates that an implication of the argument is the falsity of one well-known principle in Davidson's action theory, i.e., the principle claiming that the (primary) reason for an action is also its cause.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)137-142
    Number of pages6
    JournalThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy
    Volume9
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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    Rationalization
    Reasons for Action
    Action Theory
    Explication
    Recasts
    Names
    Causes

    Cite this

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    abstract = "This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, and the name {"}quasi-rational{"} is legitimated for the type of actions this example represents. Last, but not least, the paper demonstrates that an implication of the argument is the falsity of one well-known principle in Davidson's action theory, i.e., the principle claiming that the (primary) reason for an action is also its cause.",
    author = "Yujian ZHENG",
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    Ex ante vs. Ex post rationalization of action. / ZHENG, Yujian.

    In: The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 9, 01.01.2006, p. 137-142.

    Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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    AB - This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, and the name "quasi-rational" is legitimated for the type of actions this example represents. Last, but not least, the paper demonstrates that an implication of the argument is the falsity of one well-known principle in Davidson's action theory, i.e., the principle claiming that the (primary) reason for an action is also its cause.

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