Abstract
Bozeman's (1993; 2000) external control model of red tape posits that organizations with higher degrees of external control will have higher levels of red tape. According to the model, this effect is compounded by entropy affecting the communication of rules and their results, limited discretion over rules and procedures, and non-ownership of rules. However, the model predicts that red tape will be mediated by communication from clients and within the organization. Bozeman's model is often cited in the literature, but it has not been subjected to comprehensive empirical verification. This study tests the model using data from a multiple informant survey of 136 upper-tier English local government authorities conducted in 2004 and several secondary sources. Statistical results show that external control does indeed lead to higher levels of red tape. We then test a number of organizational feedback mediators and find that client feedback does little to mediate the effects of red tape; the major factors are trust between politicians and public managers and devolved management. We discuss these findings and propose some changes to the model. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 288-314 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | International Public Management Journal |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 2 Nov 2012 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM-XII), Brisbane, Australia, March 26–28, 2008; and the 20th Anniversary and 11th Biennial Public Management Research Association (PMRA) Conference, Syracuse, New York, June 2–4, 2011.Funding
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2011-330-B00194).