Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation

Lai Sheung, Suwina CHENG, Michael FIRTH

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non-executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)549-561
Number of pages13
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume27
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006
Externally publishedYes

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