Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation

Lai Sheung, Suwina CHENG, Michael FIRTH

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non-executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)549-561
Number of pages13
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume27
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006
Externally publishedYes

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Profitability
Compensation and Redress
Family ownership
Executive compensation
Corporate governance
Top management
Stock returns
Non-executive directors
Profit
Hong Kong
Family firms
Management compensation
Blockholders
Firm profitability

Cite this

CHENG, Lai Sheung, Suwina ; FIRTH, Michael. / Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2006 ; Vol. 27, No. 7. pp. 549-561.
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Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation. / CHENG, Lai Sheung, Suwina; FIRTH, Michael.

In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 27, No. 7, 01.01.2006, p. 549-561.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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