Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

43 Citations (Scopus)


Unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses, or output royalties, licensing contracts with only a fixed-fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences. This paper illustrates that fixed-fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the lecensee's ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser. Antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion-motivated licenses are discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)443-449
Number of pages7
JournalThe Journal of Industrial Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 1996
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this