Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses, or output royalties, licensing contracts with only a fixed-fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences. This paper illustrates that fixed-fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the lecensee's ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser. Antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion-motivated licenses are discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)443-449
Number of pages7
JournalThe Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume44
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 1996
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Fixed fee
Innovation
Licensing
Collusion
Deviation
License
Royalty

Cite this

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title = "Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion",
abstract = "Unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses, or output royalties, licensing contracts with only a fixed-fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences. This paper illustrates that fixed-fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the lecensee's ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser. Antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion-motivated licenses are discussed.",
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Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion. / LIN, Ping.

In: The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 44, No. 4, 01.12.1996, p. 443-449.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AB - Unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses, or output royalties, licensing contracts with only a fixed-fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences. This paper illustrates that fixed-fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the lecensee's ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser. Antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion-motivated licenses are discussed.

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