Abstract
It is customarily assumed that paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions to liar paradoxes require a logical system weaker than classical logic. That is, if a logic is not fragile to liar paradoxes, it must be logically weaker than classical logic. Defenders of classical logic argue that the losses of weakening it outweigh the gains. Advocates of paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions disagree. We articulate the notion of fragility with respect to the liar paradox and show that it can be disentangled from logical strength. Strength and resilience to paradox do not force a trade-off with respect to liars: there can be logics which are not weaker than classical logic and are solid to the liar.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 720-729 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Analysis (United Kingdom) |
Volume | 84 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 19 Aug 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved.
Funding
This work was supported by a OeAD (Austrian Agency for Education and Internationalisation) Ernst Mach Postdoctoral Fellowship, and by Lingnan University Postgraduate Studentships.
Keywords
- abduction
- fragility to paradox
- liar sentences
- logical strength