From Adam to Lucifer: on Frankenstein’s Creature’s Humanity and Rights

The question of whether Frankenstein’s Creature is human, post-human, a monster, or a supernatural being has been widely debated by scholars since the publication of Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus by Mary Shelley in 1818. Researchers who argue for the Creature’s humanity often approach it through the lens of rights—such as those of people of colour, trans rights, and children's disability rights. This article examines the Creature's ontological status through the human phenomena introduced by Turkish philosopher Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu in Human Philosophy, focusing solely on the Creature as a human without a label or category. The first section demonstrates the Creature meets Mengüşoğlu's "human phenomena" criteria, of the 16 phenomena identified by Mengüşoğlu, this article examines those relevant for the scope of this article: he knows, senses values, acts with free will, is educated, engages with art, foresees and predetermines, and speaks. The second section examines the consequences: if the Creature is human, he possesses human value and dignity and should be entitled to human rights. Human rights can be considered ethical responsibilities: for every person, acting with regard for the value of others and treating them with dignity prevents the squandering of human worth and reduces the likelihood of rights violations. The Creature’s treatment throughout the novel represents systematic violations of these rights: the denial of shelter, nutrition, citizenship, and a fair trial. This article aims to answer the extent to which Victor Frankenstein and other people’s failure to meet these ethical responsibilities contributed to his violent actions.