Functioning but aimless science : Alexander Bird: Knowing science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, 304 pp, £78 HB

Primarily, Knowing Science is a manifesto for a knowledge-first philosophy of science, inspired by Williamson’s (2002) knowledge-first epistemology. It champions various Willamsonian theses—for example, evidence is knowledge (E = K) and belief aims at knowledge—and draws out their consequences in a new domain. Secondarily, Knowing Science inveighs against empiricism, even of a moderate variety. It argues that evidence qua knowledge is not limited to, or founded upon, observations or perceptions.

Along the way, the book defends several significant theses that might stand or fall independently. Two are especially notable. First, scientific knowledge does not supervene on the mental states of all individuals. Second, global meta-scientific knowledge cannot be garnered from standard general arguments, such as the no miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction.

As an empiricist of a pragmatic bent, who does not think knowledge in Williamson’s (2002) sense is terribly important, even if it exists, I have my work cut out in responding; I am spoiled for choice as I disagree with so much of Knowing Science. The ultimate reason is that Bird and I have radically different starting points. Indeed, I suspect that our views are irreconcilable because we have different ‘hinges’, and that neither of us knows (especially in an internalist sense) which are true or otherwise appropriate. We can exchange arguments and hope for a modicum of resultant light, nevertheless.

My subsequent critique will focus on Bird’s claims about the aim of science and the aim of belief, which underpin the book’s thesis about what scientific progress consists in.