Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions

Chi KWOK; Chris Man Kong LI

doi:10.1002/japp.70071

Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions

Chi KWOK^*
, Chris Man Kong LI

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Government and International Affairs

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

What constitutes a good corporate agent? The article answers this question by critically applying List and Pettit's theory of group agency, which emphasizes three crucial dimensions of organizational design: epistemic quality, incentive compatibility, and control. Integrating empirical insights from sociology and organizational studies, we argue that List and Pettit's framework implies a non-contingent relationship between good corporate agents and egalitarian structures. This article makes two contributions: (1) it enriches debates in the political theory of the firm by clarifying how group agency concepts impact the normative understanding of corporate structures; (2) it strengthens the normative foundations of List and Pettit's framework by situating their theoretical criteria within empirical evidence of organizational effectiveness.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Applied Philosophy
Early online date	22 Jan 2026
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/japp.70071
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 22 Jan 2026

Bibliographical note

We would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback, which substantially improved the article. An early draft of this article was presented at the 81st Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference in 2024. We would like to thank the panel participants for their comments.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 The Author(s). Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.

Funding

This research was supported by an Early Career Scheme (ECS) grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project Number: 23602922).

Access to Document

10.1002/japp.70071Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions",

abstract = "What constitutes a good corporate agent? The article answers this question by critically applying List and Pettit's theory of group agency, which emphasizes three crucial dimensions of organizational design: epistemic quality, incentive compatibility, and control. Integrating empirical insights from sociology and organizational studies, we argue that List and Pettit's framework implies a non-contingent relationship between good corporate agents and egalitarian structures. This article makes two contributions: (1) it enriches debates in the political theory of the firm by clarifying how group agency concepts impact the normative understanding of corporate structures; (2) it strengthens the normative foundations of List and Pettit's framework by situating their theoretical criteria within empirical evidence of organizational effectiveness.",

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Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

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Epistemic Injustice and Corporate Arrangements

Cite this

Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

Epistemic Injustice and Corporate Arrangements

Cite this