How business community institutions can help fight corruption

Avinash K. DIXIT

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts is analyzed, by analogy with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The suggested anti-corruption institution comprises a no-bribery norm, a system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a tribunal. In combination with formal state law, a business institution of sufficient quality-probability of detection and severity of punishment-can eliminate corruption; a less good institution helps reduce it. The legal and communal institutions together achieve substantially better outcomes than either by itself.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)S25-S47
Number of pages23
JournalWorld Bank Economic Review
Volume29
Issue numberSupp.
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Fingerprint

corruption
community
collective action
penalty
state law
collective behavior
license
historian
economics
contract
Corruption
Law
Severity
Probability of detection
Punishment
Violations
Anti-corruption
Economic law
Collective action
Bribery

Bibliographical note

Paper presented at the 25th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), Jun 02-03, 2014, World Bank Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Cite this

DIXIT, Avinash K. / How business community institutions can help fight corruption. In: World Bank Economic Review. 2015 ; Vol. 29, No. Supp. pp. S25-S47.
@article{474aca7b69f54a73942035f1d1b69b1d,
title = "How business community institutions can help fight corruption",
abstract = "Collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts is analyzed, by analogy with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The suggested anti-corruption institution comprises a no-bribery norm, a system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a tribunal. In combination with formal state law, a business institution of sufficient quality-probability of detection and severity of punishment-can eliminate corruption; a less good institution helps reduce it. The legal and communal institutions together achieve substantially better outcomes than either by itself.",
author = "DIXIT, {Avinash K.}",
note = "Paper presented at the 25th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), Jun 02-03, 2014, World Bank Headquarters, Washington, DC.",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1093/wber/lhv016",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "S25--S47",
journal = "World Bank Economic Review",
issn = "0258-6770",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "Supp.",

}

How business community institutions can help fight corruption. / DIXIT, Avinash K.

In: World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 29, No. Supp., 2015, p. S25-S47.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - How business community institutions can help fight corruption

AU - DIXIT, Avinash K.

N1 - Paper presented at the 25th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), Jun 02-03, 2014, World Bank Headquarters, Washington, DC.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts is analyzed, by analogy with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The suggested anti-corruption institution comprises a no-bribery norm, a system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a tribunal. In combination with formal state law, a business institution of sufficient quality-probability of detection and severity of punishment-can eliminate corruption; a less good institution helps reduce it. The legal and communal institutions together achieve substantially better outcomes than either by itself.

AB - Collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts is analyzed, by analogy with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The suggested anti-corruption institution comprises a no-bribery norm, a system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a tribunal. In combination with formal state law, a business institution of sufficient quality-probability of detection and severity of punishment-can eliminate corruption; a less good institution helps reduce it. The legal and communal institutions together achieve substantially better outcomes than either by itself.

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/6804

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84939634653&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/wber/lhv016

DO - 10.1093/wber/lhv016

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 29

SP - S25-S47

JO - World Bank Economic Review

JF - World Bank Economic Review

SN - 0258-6770

IS - Supp.

ER -