How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages22
JournalSynthese
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 10 Jun 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

Keywords

  • Representationalism
  • Dispositionalism
  • Belief
  • Degrees of belief
  • Fodor
  • Dispositional representationalism

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