Abstract
Blockchain, as an emerging technology, facilitates transactions in supply chain finance. This paper explores how blockchain addresses the information asymmetry between contracting parties before and after contract signing, thereby resolving corporate breach of contract issues. We conducted a two-stage game evolution analysis, demonstrating that under the blockchain model, when the marginal profit of information sharing is greater than zero and with the costs of concealing corporate breaches are high or the benefits derived from such breaches are diminished, both parties will adopt a strategy of fully sharing information and fully performing contracts. Furthermore, through empirical analysis, we emphasize the average positive effect of blockchain use in improving corporate breach of contract issues. Additionally, the heterogeneity analysis in this paper indicates that the internal factor of a company’s life cycle and external factors such as the company’s competitive intensity and media attention, respectively, influence the company’s default by affecting the completeness of information transmission, the benefits of default, and the costs of concealing a default.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 134090 |
| Journal | Expert Systems with Applications |
| Volume | 333 |
| Early online date | 19 Aug 2026 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 19 Aug 2026 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2026 Elsevier Ltd. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
Funding
This work was supported by the Major Program of National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China (22&ZD117) and the National Social Science Fund of China (20BJL020).
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Blockchain
- Breach of contract
- Information asymmetry
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