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How does blockchain address breach of contract issues in transactions?

  • Wei JIANG
  • , Chunxing GAO*
  • , Dianyao KANG
  • , Qiongwen ZHANG
  • , Guanrui YI
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

Blockchain, as an emerging technology, facilitates transactions in supply chain finance. This paper explores how blockchain addresses the information asymmetry between contracting parties before and after contract signing, thereby resolving corporate breach of contract issues. We conducted a two-stage game evolution analysis, demonstrating that under the blockchain model, when the marginal profit of information sharing is greater than zero and with the costs of concealing corporate breaches are high or the benefits derived from such breaches are diminished, both parties will adopt a strategy of fully sharing information and fully performing contracts. Furthermore, through empirical analysis, we emphasize the average positive effect of blockchain use in improving corporate breach of contract issues. Additionally, the heterogeneity analysis in this paper indicates that the internal factor of a company’s life cycle and external factors such as the company’s competitive intensity and media attention, respectively, influence the company’s default by affecting the completeness of information transmission, the benefits of default, and the costs of concealing a default.
Original languageEnglish
Article number134090
JournalExpert Systems with Applications
Volume333
Early online date19 Aug 2026
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 19 Aug 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Elsevier Ltd. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.

Funding

This work was supported by the Major Program of National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China (22&ZD117) and the National Social Science Fund of China (20BJL020).

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Blockchain
  • Breach of contract
  • Information asymmetry

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