How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency

Derek Clayton BAKER, Jack WOODS

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)


We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-424
Number of pages34
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015

Bibliographical note

The work in this article was partially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (project LU342612).


Dive into the research topics of 'How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this