How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

16 Citations (Scopus)


We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-424
Number of pages34
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015


Bibliographical note

The work in this article was partially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (project LU342612).

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