How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-424
Number of pages34
JournalEthics
Volume125
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015

Fingerprint

Expressivist
Inconsistency
Frege-Geach Problem
Realist
Orthodoxy
Misinterpretation
Logical Consequence
Expressivism
Semantic Theory

Bibliographical note

The work in this article was partially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (project LU342612).

Cite this

BAKER, Derek Clayton ; WOODS, Jack. / How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency. In: Ethics. 2015 ; Vol. 125, No. 2. pp. 391-424.
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How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency. / BAKER, Derek Clayton; WOODS, Jack.

In: Ethics, Vol. 125, No. 2, 01.2015, p. 391-424.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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