TY - JOUR
T1 - Humean laws and explanation
AU - MARSHALL, Daniel Graham
PY - 2015/12
Y1 - 2015/12
N2 - A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should regard as laws. I will then conclude by rebutting a variant of this objection that appeals to a principle of metaphysical explanation recently put forward by Kit Fine.
AB - A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should regard as laws. I will then conclude by rebutting a variant of this objection that appeals to a principle of metaphysical explanation recently put forward by Kit Fine.
KW - David Lewis
KW - Explanation
KW - Grounding
KW - Humeanism
KW - Kit Fine
KW - Laws
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/6135
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84945484584&doi=10.1007%2fs11098-015-0462-9&partnerID=40&md5=b1aaaa45171e3e0a7edddbf0a1b8d238
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0462-9
DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0462-9
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 172
SP - 3145
EP - 3165
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 12
ER -