Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Artyom SHNEYEROV, Chi Leung, Adam WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)574-582
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume72
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Nonparametric identification
  • auctions

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