Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Artyom SHNEYEROV; Chi Leung, Adam WONG

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011

Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Artyom SHNEYEROV, Chi Leung, Adam WONG

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	574-582
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	72
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2011
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Nonparametric identification
auctions

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10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011

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title = "Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable",

abstract = "Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.",

keywords = "Nonparametric identification, auctions",

author = "Artyom SHNEYEROV and WONG, {Chi Leung, Adam}",

year = "2011",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011",

language = "English",

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AU - SHNEYEROV, Artyom

AU - WONG, Chi Leung, Adam

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Y1 - 2011/6/1

N2 - Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

AB - Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

KW - Nonparametric identification

KW - auctions

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 72

SP - 574

EP - 582

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Abstract

Keywords

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