Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Artyom SHNEYEROV, Chi Leung, Adam WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)574-582
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume72
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Intimate partner violence
Paradigm
Dutch auction
Nonparametric identification
Reserve price
Auctions
First-price auction

Keywords

  • Nonparametric identification
  • auctions

Cite this

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Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. / SHNEYEROV, Artyom; WONG, Chi Leung, Adam.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72, No. 2, 01.06.2011, p. 574-582.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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