Abstract
Nash solutions for two-player bargaining problems with non-convexity are shown to be dictatorial selections of Nash product maximizers in recent literature. In this paper we show that these solutions are implementable as unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocations of a sequential game.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 46-49 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 178 |
Early online date | 20 Feb 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2019 |
Funding
We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Youngsub Chun, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko, Abraham Neyman, Hans Peters, Yair Tauman, Shmuel Zamir, Yongsheng Xu, Junjie Zhou, and seminar and conference participants at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2015 International Conference on Industrial Organization at Zhejiang University, June 17–18, Hangzhou China, 2015 Asian Game Theory Conference, August 24–26, Tokyo, and the 28th
Keywords
- Bargaining problem
- Non-convexity
- Nash solution
- Implementation