Implementation of Nash bargaining solutions with non-convexity

Cheng Zhong QIN, Guofu TAN, Adam Chi Leung WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Nash solutions for two-player bargaining problems with non-convexity are shown to be dictatorial selections of Nash product maximizers in recent literature. In this paper we show that these solutions are implementable as unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocations of a sequential game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)46-49
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume178
Early online date20 Feb 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2019

Funding

We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Youngsub Chun, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko, Abraham Neyman, Hans Peters, Yair Tauman, Shmuel Zamir, Yongsheng Xu, Junjie Zhou, and seminar and conference participants at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2015 International Conference on Industrial Organization at Zhejiang University, June 17–18, Hangzhou China, 2015 Asian Game Theory Conference, August 24–26, Tokyo, and the 28th

Keywords

  • Bargaining problem
  • Non-convexity
  • Nash solution
  • Implementation

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