Projects per year
Abstract
We investigate a manufacturer–retailer channel to explore the role of a retailer in assuring the quality of a manufacturer's product as a quality gatekeeper. Such a gatekeeping activity can entail a reduction in the defective rate for consumers, if the retailer charges the manufacturer a penalty for each identified defect that is no smaller than the market penalty for an unidentified defect. As a result of the retailer's gatekeeping, the change in the negotiated wholesale price only depends on the manufacturer's individual benefit, whereas the change in the retailer's optimal retail price is associated with the channel-wide benefit. When the impact of quality relative to retail price on demand is higher, the retailer benefits more from her gatekeeping activity, thus having a greater incentive to take on the quality gatekeeping responsibility. Moreover, the retailer's gatekeeping generates a larger increase in the demand as well as each firm's profit, when the retailer has a stronger relative bargaining power.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 779-790 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Production and Operations Management |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 5 |
Early online date | 26 Aug 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2016 |
Bibliographical note
The authors are grateful to the Department Editor (Professor Albert Ha), the Senior Editor, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that helped improve this study.Funding
For this research, the first author (Mingming Leng) is supported by the General Research Fund (GRF) of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council under Research Project No. LU341012.
Keywords
- bargaining
- pricing; game theory
- quality gatekeeping
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Implications for the role of retails in quality assurance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished