Abstract
Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Episteme |
Early online date | 11 Oct 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 11 Oct 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2023 The Author(s).
Keywords
- Aesthetic judgments
- the acquaintance principle
- Conceptual art
- aesthetic knowledge
- aesthetic concepts