Incentive and corruption in Chinese economic reform

Chengze, Simon FAN, Herschel I. GROSSMAN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


The paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of the threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-206
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Policy Reform
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2001


  • China
  • Communist party
  • Incentives
  • corruption
  • economic reform


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