Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Yongling GAO; Mingming LENG

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Yongling GAO, Mingming LENG

FACULTY OF BUSINESS

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	473-476
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	49
Issue number	4
Early online date	13 May 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010
Publication status	Published - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.

Funding

The first author ( Yongling Gao ) was supported by the Humanities and Social Science Research Project of Ministry of Education of China ( 17YJC630027 ) and the National Social Science Fund of China ( 18BGL217 ). The second author ( Mingming Leng ) was supported by the General Research Fund (GRF) of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council under Research Project No. LU13500020 .

Keywords

Electric vehicles
Subsidy
Driving range
Game theory
Duopoly

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

Cite this

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abstract = "We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.",

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KW - Electric vehicles

KW - Subsidy

KW - Driving range

KW - Game theory

KW - Duopoly

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JF - Operations Research Letters

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ER -

Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

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Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

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