Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Yongling GAO; Mingming LENG

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Yongling GAO
, Mingming LENG

FACULTY OF BUSINESS

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	473-476
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	49
Issue number	4
Early online date	13 May 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010
Publication status	Published - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.

Funding

The first author ( Yongling Gao ) was supported by the Humanities and Social Science Research Project of Ministry of Education of China ( 17YJC630027 ) and the National Social Science Fund of China ( 18BGL217 ). The second author ( Mingming Leng ) was supported by the General Research Fund (GRF) of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council under Research Project No. LU13500020 .

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

Keywords

Electric vehicles
Subsidy
Driving range
Game theory
Duopoly

Access to Document

10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

Cite this

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title = "Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis",

abstract = "We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.",

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author = "Yongling GAO and Mingming LENG",

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language = "English",

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AU - LENG, Mingming

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N2 - We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.

AB - We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.

KW - Electric vehicles

KW - Subsidy

KW - Driving range

KW - Game theory

KW - Duopoly

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85110500509

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.010

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

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EP - 476

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JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 4

ER -

Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

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Cite this

Incentivizing the adoption of electric vehicles under subsidy schemes: A duopoly analysis

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

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