Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain

Huajiang LUO, Weixin SHANG, Tian LI

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

Abstract

We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer selling to one retailer who processes private demand information over two selling periods. We examine the retailer’s information sharing decisions with and without side payment, and firms’ subsequent pricing decisions. Without information sharing, in period 2 the manufacturer will infer the retailer’s private information via period-1 order quantity. We find that the retailer does not share the information voluntarily due to harmful double marginalization. However, the retailer shares the information to the manufacturer with side payments when demand uncertainty is high.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 22 Oct 2017
Event2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting - George R. Brown Convention Center & Hilton Americas Houston, Houston, United States
Duration: 22 Oct 201725 Oct 2017
http://meetings2.informs.org/wordpress/houston2017/

Conference

Conference2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting
CountryUnited States
CityHouston
Period22/10/1725/10/17
Internet address

Fingerprint

Retailers
Leakage
Decentralized supply chain
Information sharing
Side payments
Demand uncertainty
Order quantity
Double marginalization
Pricing decisions
Supply chain
Private information

Cite this

LUO, H., SHANG, W., & LI, T. (2017). Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain. 2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, United States.
LUO, Huajiang ; SHANG, Weixin ; LI, Tian. / Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain. 2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, United States.
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LUO, H, SHANG, W & LI, T 2017, 'Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain' 2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, United States, 22/10/17 - 25/10/17, .

Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain. / LUO, Huajiang; SHANG, Weixin; LI, Tian.

2017. 2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, United States.

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

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AU - LI, Tian

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N2 - We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer selling to one retailer who processes private demand information over two selling periods. We examine the retailer’s information sharing decisions with and without side payment, and firms’ subsequent pricing decisions. Without information sharing, in period 2 the manufacturer will infer the retailer’s private information via period-1 order quantity. We find that the retailer does not share the information voluntarily due to harmful double marginalization. However, the retailer shares the information to the manufacturer with side payments when demand uncertainty is high.

AB - We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer selling to one retailer who processes private demand information over two selling periods. We examine the retailer’s information sharing decisions with and without side payment, and firms’ subsequent pricing decisions. Without information sharing, in period 2 the manufacturer will infer the retailer’s private information via period-1 order quantity. We find that the retailer does not share the information voluntarily due to harmful double marginalization. However, the retailer shares the information to the manufacturer with side payments when demand uncertainty is high.

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LUO H, SHANG W, LI T. Information Leakage And Sharing In A Two-period Decentralized Supply Chain. 2017. 2017 INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, United States.