Information manipulation and climate agreements

Fuhai HONG, Xiaojian ZHAO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


It appears that news media and some pro-environmental organizations have the tendency to accentuate or even exaggerate the damage caused by climate change. This article provides a rationale for this tendency by using a modified International Environmental Agreement (IEA) model with asymmetric information. We find that the information manipulation has an instrumental value, as it ex post induces more countries to participate in an IEA, which will eventually enhance global welfare. From the ex ante perspective, however, the impact that manipulating information has on the level of participation in an IEA and on welfare is ambiguous.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)851-861
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics
Issue number3
Early online date24 Feb 2014
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014
Externally publishedYes


  • Asymmetric information
  • climate change
  • information transmission
  • international environmental agreements

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