Projects per year
Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing retailer's demand information in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. We examine several scenarios with either the retailer or the manufacturers as leaders in offering information (sharing) contracts. We show that a larger production diseconomy or higher competition intensity induces more information sharing. The retailer may benefit from a larger production diseconomy, which is not possible without information contracting. Information contracting always benefits the retailer, and the benefit is larger when she offers contracts sequentially rather than simultaneously to the manufacturers. Information contracting benefits the manufacturers only when they offer the contracts and production diseconomy is large. When either demand uncertainty or production diseconomy is large, the retailer invests more in improving information accuracy. When competition is more intense, she invests more except under some conditions that we fully characterize.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 245-263 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Management Science |
Volume | 62 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 5 Jun 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2016 |
Bibliographical note
The authors thank the department editor, the associate editor, and three anonymous reviewers, as well as the seminar participants at University of Miami, National University of Singapore, Singapore Management University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Nanjing University, and Sun Yat-Sen University for thoughtful comments and suggestions.Keywords
- supply chain management; common retailer; incentive; information sharing; nonlinear production cost; manufacturer competition
- common retailer
- incentive
- information sharing
- nonlinear production cost
- manufacturer competition
Projects
- 1 Finished
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Managing Green Supply via Carbon Emission Labeling (使用碳排放标签来管理绿色供应链)
SHANG, W. (PI)
Research Grants Council (HKSAR)
1/01/15 → 31/12/16
Project: Grant Research