Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentation

Abstract

We consider a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. The retailer decides whether to share a private imperfect demand signal with any of the two manufacturers. We consider two cases where the manufacturers face either economies or diseconomies of scale in production. We show how production economies/diseconomies, competition intensity and information contracting influence the firms’ equilibrium decisions as well as their profits.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2 Jul 2013
Event26th EURO-INFORMS Conference on Operational Research : EURO-INFORMS Joint International Meeting - Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
Duration: 1 Jul 20134 Jul 2013
https://euro2013.euro-online.org/data/http_/euro2013.org/index.html

Conference

Conference26th EURO-INFORMS Conference on Operational Research : EURO-INFORMS Joint International Meeting
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityRome
Period1/07/134/07/13
Internet address

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