We consider a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. The retailer decides whether to share a private imperfect demand signal with any of the two manufacturers. We consider two cases where the manufacturers face either economies or diseconomies of scale in production. We show how production economies/diseconomies, competition intensity and information contracting influence the firms’ equilibrium decisions as well as their profits.
|Publication status||Published - 2 Jul 2013|
|Event||26th EURO-INFORMS Conference on Operational Research : EURO-INFORMS Joint International Meeting - Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy|
Duration: 1 Jul 2013 → 4 Jul 2013
|Conference||26th EURO-INFORMS Conference on Operational Research : EURO-INFORMS Joint International Meeting|
|Period||1/07/13 → 4/07/13|