Abstract
This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1144-1155 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of Banking and Finance |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2009 |
Funding
We thank Ike Mathur (the editor) and an anonymous reviewer for many constructive comments that helped improve the quality of the paper significantly. Financial support from Lingnan University (DR07B2) and an earmarked grant from the HKSAR (CERG LU340307) are greatly acknowledged.
Keywords
- Bank loans
- China
- Lending decisions
- Private sector