Intentions and interpretations

Alfred R. MELE, Paisley Nathan LIVINGSTON

    Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › Research › peer-review

    Abstract

    Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One argument has it, for example, that in order to move from one point to another, a thing must first move to the half-way point; to do that, it must move half way to that point; and so on forever: so nothing ever moves at all. The argument undoubtedly stopped some auditors in their tracks; but eventually they moved on, most of them fully confident that they were doing precisely that.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)931-949
    Number of pages19
    JournalMLN
    Volume107
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 1992

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    Intentions
    Unreality
    Intentional Action
    Grab
    Aristotelian
    Zeno
    Philosophy

    Cite this

    MELE, Alfred R. ; LIVINGSTON, Paisley Nathan. / Intentions and interpretations. In: MLN. 1992 ; Vol. 107, No. 5. pp. 931-949.
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    MELE, AR & LIVINGSTON, PN 1992, 'Intentions and interpretations', MLN, vol. 107, no. 5, pp. 931-949. https://doi.org/10.2307/2904825

    Intentions and interpretations. / MELE, Alfred R.; LIVINGSTON, Paisley Nathan.

    In: MLN, Vol. 107, No. 5, 01.12.1992, p. 931-949.

    Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › Research › peer-review

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    AU - LIVINGSTON, Paisley Nathan

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    N2 - Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One argument has it, for example, that in order to move from one point to another, a thing must first move to the half-way point; to do that, it must move half way to that point; and so on forever: so nothing ever moves at all. The argument undoubtedly stopped some auditors in their tracks; but eventually they moved on, most of them fully confident that they were doing precisely that.

    AB - Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One argument has it, for example, that in order to move from one point to another, a thing must first move to the half-way point; to do that, it must move half way to that point; and so on forever: so nothing ever moves at all. The argument undoubtedly stopped some auditors in their tracks; but eventually they moved on, most of them fully confident that they were doing precisely that.

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    MELE AR, LIVINGSTON PN. Intentions and interpretations. MLN. 1992 Dec 1;107(5):931-949. https://doi.org/10.2307/2904825

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