International Environmental Agreements with endogenous or exogenous risk

Fuhai HONG, Larry KARP

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


We examine the effect of endogenous and exogenous risk on the equilibrium (expected) membership of an International Environmental Agreement when countries are risk averse. Endogenous risk arises when countries use mixed rather than pure strategies at the participation game, and exogenous risk arises from the inherent uncertainty about the costs and benefits of increased abatement. Under endogenous risk, an increase in risk aversion increases expected participation. Under exogenous risk and pure strategies, increased risk aversion weakly decreases equilibrium participation if and only if the variance of income decreases with abatement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)365-394
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Issue number3
Early online date2 Sept 2014
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2014
Externally publishedYes


  • Climate agreement
  • Endogenous risk
  • Exogenous risk
  • International Environmental Agreement
  • Mixed strategy
  • Risk aversion

Cite this