Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties

Daniel MARSHALL; Brain WEATHERSON

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties

Daniel MARSHALL
, Brain WEATHERSON

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Reference Entry › peer-review

Abstract

We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in philosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately, when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reason to suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that each of these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
Publisher	Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University
Edition	substantive revision Thu Jan 11, 2018
Publication status	Published - 11 Jan 2018

Bibliographical note

As of the 2012 revision, Dan Marshall has taken over responsibility for maintaining and keeping this entry current. We would like to thank the referees of this entry for their very helpful comments.

Access to Document

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/

Cite this

@inbook{4010709f094d47a2bcda0665bbc424a9,

title = "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties",

abstract = "We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in philosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately, when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reason to suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that each of these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis.",

author = "Daniel MARSHALL and Brain WEATHERSON",

note = "As of the 2012 revision, Dan Marshall has taken over responsibility for maintaining and keeping this entry current. We would like to thank the referees of this entry for their very helpful comments.",

year = "2018",

month = jan,

day = "11",

language = "English",

booktitle = "Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy",

publisher = "Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University",

address = "United States",

edition = "substantive revision Thu Jan 11, 2018",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties

AU - MARSHALL, Daniel

AU - WEATHERSON, Brain

N1 - As of the 2012 revision, Dan Marshall has taken over responsibility for maintaining and keeping this entry current. We would like to thank the referees of this entry for their very helpful comments.

PY - 2018/1/11

Y1 - 2018/1/11

N2 - We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in philosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately, when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reason to suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that each of these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis.

AB - We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in philosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately, when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reason to suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that each of these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis.

UR - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/

M3 - Reference Entry

BT - Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

PB - Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University

ER -

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties

Cite this