Intrinsicality and grounding

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theories. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume90
Issue number1
Early online date3 Jul 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015
Externally publishedYes

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Grounding
Metaphysical
Entity
Intrinsic
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Cite this

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Intrinsicality and grounding. / MARSHALL, Daniel Graham.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 90, No. 1, 01.2015, p. 1-19.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AB - A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theories. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.

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