Intuitions in science : thought experiments as argument pumps

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Abstract

This chapter presents and criticizes the two dominant accounts of thought experiments in science, due to James Robert Brown and John Norton; the mechanical thought experiment of Simon Stevin is used as an exemplar. The chapter argues that scientific thought experiments are strongly analogous to their ‘real’, actual physical, counterparts. In each kind of experiment, theoretical context affects which arguments are generated and/or thought to be sustainable on the basis of the states of affairs involved. The difference is whether the states of affairs are hypothetical and/or counterfactual rather than actual. This view is consistent with empiricism concerning scientific thought experiments. On such empiricism, the (good) arguments that it is possible to pump from thought experiments have premises grounded in experience, rather than an additional faculty.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIntuitions
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages119-134
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9780191669125
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

Fingerprint

Thought Experiments
Intuition
States of Affairs
Empiricism
Physical
Simon Stevin
Scientific Empiricism
Experiment

Bibliographical note

The same paper is also presented at: the 39th Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, Durban, Southern Africa, January, 2013, the 39th Annual Philosophy of Science Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, April, 2012, and the Philosophy Seminar, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 26 April, 2013.

Keywords

  • James Robert Brown
  • John Norton
  • Simon Stevin
  • empiricism
  • scientific experiments
  • thought experiments

Cite this

ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick. / Intuitions in science : thought experiments as argument pumps. Intuitions. Oxford University Press, 2014. pp. 119-134
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Intuitions in science : thought experiments as argument pumps. / ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick.

Intuitions. Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 119-134.

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference ProceedingsBook ChapterResearchpeer-review

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