Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

Kong Wing, Clement CHOW, M., Frank SONG, Kit Pong WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-227
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Review of Economics and Finance
Volume19
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2010

Fingerprint

China
Soft budget constraint
Moral hazard
State ownership
Investment-cash flow sensitivity
Incentive effect
Investment behavior
Severity
Listed companies
Liquidity
Empirical model

Keywords

  • Investment-cash flow sensitivities
  • Moral hazard
  • Soft budget constraints

Cite this

CHOW, Kong Wing, Clement ; SONG, M., Frank ; WONG, Kit Pong. / Investment and the soft budget constraint in China. In: International Review of Economics and Finance. 2010 ; Vol. 19, No. 2. pp. 219-227.
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Investment and the soft budget constraint in China. / CHOW, Kong Wing, Clement; SONG, M., Frank; WONG, Kit Pong.

In: International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 19, No. 2, 01.04.2010, p. 219-227.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AB - This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.

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