Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade?

Barbara J. SPENCER, Larry D. QIU

Research output: Working paperWorking paper series

Abstract

This paper develops a model of informal procurement within Japanese keiretsu so as to consider effects on intermediate-good imports, such as auto parts. Parts-suppliers make relationship-specific investments that benefit the auto-maker and prices are determined by bargaining after investment has been sunk. Although this investment raises efficiency, it limits the range of imports to less important parts such as tail pipes and it is possible that no parts are imported, despite lower foreign production costs. Lack of information concerning investment rents combined with counterintuitive effects on imports and Japanese production costs could create unwarranted perceptions of a trade barrier.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherNational Bureau of Economic Research
Number of pages43
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2000
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameNBER Working Paper
PublisherNational Bureau of Economic Research
No.7572

Fingerprint

Keiretsu
Import
Relationship-specific investments
Production cost
Investment efficiency
Rent
Intermediate goods
Suppliers
Procurement
Trade barriers

Cite this

SPENCER, B. J., & QIU, L. D. (2000). Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade? (NBER Working Paper; No. 7572). National Bureau of Economic Research.
SPENCER, Barbara J. ; QIU, Larry D. / Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade?. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000. (NBER Working Paper; 7572).
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SPENCER, BJ & QIU, LD 2000 'Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade?' NBER Working Paper, no. 7572, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade? / SPENCER, Barbara J.; QIU, Larry D.

National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000. (NBER Working Paper; No. 7572).

Research output: Working paperWorking paper series

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SPENCER BJ, QIU LD. Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade? National Bureau of Economic Research. 2000 Feb. (NBER Working Paper; 7572).