Kleptocracy and corruption

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we develop a model that analyzes the competition and strategic interactions between a kleptocratic ruler and his officials in rent seeking. The ruler implements anti-corruption measures, which include wage incentives and monitoring, to discourage his opportunistic officials from seeking bribes to obtain more rent for himself. We show that the ruler pays an efficiency wage to his officials to eliminate corruption if and only if monitoring is relatively effective. We also demonstrate that, in a proprietary state, the ruler always sets an inefficiently high tax rate in order to discourage the officials from demanding bribes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)57-74
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Comparative Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2006


  • Corruption
  • Corruption deterrence
  • Kleptocracy
  • Rent-seeking competition

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