Knowledge is not enough

Jennifer Ellen NADO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge . I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)658-672
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume95
Issue number4
Early online date15 Jan 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • experimental philosophy
  • intuition
  • metaphilosophy

Cite this