Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science : a resolution at the group level

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.031

Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science : a resolution at the group level

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

43 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended (for the vast majority of the time). Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions (at any given point in time). The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	117-124
Number of pages	8
Journal	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Volume	42
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.031
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2011
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

The earlier versions of the paper are presented at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, 2008, and Ockham Society, University of Oxford, February 2009.

Funding

This is an output from my ‘Group Rationality and the Dynamics of Inquiry’ research project, funded by the British Academy via their Postdoctoral Fellowship scheme.

Access to Document

10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.031

Cite this

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abstract = "Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for {\textquoteleft}normal scientists{\textquoteright}. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended (for the vast majority of the time). Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions (at any given point in time). The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and {\textquoteleft}offensive{\textquoteright} critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes {\textquoteleft}How should the balance between functions be struck?{\textquoteright}",

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Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science : a resolution at the group level

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Access to Document

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Karl Popper

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